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Parameters
Summer 2006
Robert M. Cassidy |
The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency A task force that organizes and integrates special, conventional, and indigenous forces against terrorists, leveraging the best counterinsurgency practices, would be able to carry out the full range of counterinsurgency requirements within an autonomous area of operations.   |
Parameters
Autumn 2006
Michael R. Melillo |
Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities Unfortunately, it took the tragedy of 9/11 and the challenges posed by an adaptive enemy for the U.S. to realize it was not prepared to fight war on terms other than its own choosing. |
Vietnam
June 28, 2004
James Donovan |
Combined Action Program: Marines' Alternative to Search and Destroy The U.S. Marine Corps CAP just might have been a viable alternative to MACV's 'big battalions' strategy in Vietnam. |
Parameters
Winter 2005/2006
Jeffrey Record |
Why the Strong Lose Why has the United States fared consistently well against such powerful enemies as Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union, but its record against lesser foes is decidedly mixed? |
National Defense
August 2007
James A. Gavrilis |
Army Must Embrace Unconventional Fight Even a major unconventional campaign such as Iraq can have major conventional operations as part of it. In war the two are not mutually exclusive. The trick is finding the right mix. |
Parameters
Spring 2004
Robert R. Tomes |
Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare Thirty years after the signing of the January 1973 Paris peace agreement ending the Vietnam War, the United States finds itself leading a broad coalition of military forces engaged in peacemaking, nation-building, and now counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq. |
Parameters
Summer 2006
David W. Barno |
Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency Strategy in a global counterinsurgency requires a new level of thinking. A world of irregular threats and asymmetrical warfare demands that we Americans broaden our thinking beyond the norms of traditional military action once sufficient to win our wars. |
Parameters
Autumn 2007
Christopher M. Schnaubelt |
Whither the RMA? The present Department of Defense (DOD) focus on technological solutions to increase capabilities may be misguided by a vision of a high-tech Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). |
Parameters
Summer 2007
Frank G. Hoffman |
Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency? A look at the impact and implications of the classical school of thought on revolutionary warfare and an evaluation of the newly issued Army/Marine counterinsurgency (COIN) manual. |
Parameters
Summer 2008
Robert M. Chamberlain |
With Friends Like These: Grievance, Governance, and Capacity-Building in COIN This article questions the assumption that enhancing the power of the state will make the population less likely to support insurgents. |
Parameters
Summer 2008
Kenneth Payne |
Waging Communication War This article sets out to explore the ramifications of poor communication and lack of support of the population in a modern war. |
Parameters
Autumn 2008 |
Commentary & Reply Dispute over using airpower in counterinsurgency (COIN)... Waging the communication war... |
Parameters
Spring 2005
Timothy K. Deady |
Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902 These events--from a century ago--share a number of striking parallels with the events of 2003 and 2004. The Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902 was America's first major combat operation of the 20th century. |
National Defense
October 2011
Sandra I. Erwin |
Pentagon Should Think Twice Before It Cuts Ground Forces, Historians Warn In the wake of every conflict since World War II, ground troops have been declared obsolete. And each time, the prognosticators have been wrong, says military historian John C. McManus. |
Parameters
Summer 2006
Lou DiMarco |
Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionnaire in the Algerian War Torture also has been the subject of much domestic political debate in the US. The French experience in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 is one of the clearest examples of how ill-conceived interrogation techniques contributed directly to the strategic failure of a counterinsurgency and the success of an insurgency. |
Parameters
Summer 2007 |
Book Reviews Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 by Mark Moyar offers fresh insights on the war... Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945 by Catherine Merridale is social history at it's best... etc. |
Vietnam
John M. Carland |
Interview with NVA General Tran Van Tra The field commander of military operations in the South, Tran Van Tra was North Vietnam's counterpart to General William Westmoreland. |
Parameters
Spring 2006 |
Commentary & Reply Komer, CORDS, and Pacification: a reader commentary to Blowtorch: Robert Komer and the Making of Vietnam Pacification Policy... The Author Replies: Robert Komer and his US colleagues were not the only ones who perceived pacification chiefly as an internal problem... |
Parameters
Winter 2006/2007
Martin J. Muckian |
Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies: Adapting to the New Adversary The ongoing conflict in Iraq has sparked a renewed interest in the study of counterinsurgency, leading many to comb the wars of the twentieth century for lessons that can be applied to today. Much of this recent analysis has focused on the knowledge gained from fighting Marxist revolutionaries. |
Parameters
Summer 2007
Brian Reed |
A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency A network analysis of war and insurgency differs markedly from conventional approaches, a fact that might require us to rethink some of our more conventional analytical tools. |
National Defense
August 2009
Sandra I. Erwin |
Future War: How The Game is Changing "It's hard to concentrate on a grand strategy when your house is on fire," said Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis, head of U.S. Joint Forces Command. Even as they cope with the frantic demands of two major wars, military leaders say they have a clearer sense of the future than they did in the 1990s. |
Parameters
Winter 2005/2006
Mitchell J. Thompson |
Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power There have been few truly transformational changes to the institutions of national security, only slight modifications to the existing ones. |
Parameters
Summer 2005
Christopher M. Ford |
Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population's Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency Using Iraq as a model, this article seeks to examine the relationship between the people and the insurgency, with the ultimate questions being: What role does the civilian population play in the insurgency, and how can this situation be influenced to achieve success? |
Parameters
Autumn 2006
Jeffrey Record |
External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success For either the insurgent side or the counterinsurgent side, material strength unguided by sound strategy and unsupported by sufficient willingness to fight and die is a recipe for almost certain defeat. But most insurgencies seek foreign help for good reason. |
Parameters
Summer 2007
Patrick Porter |
Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War To wage war, become an anthropologist. Today's military confrontation of "the West vs. the rest" replays ancient differences between strategic cultures. |
Parameters
Spring 2006 |
Book Reviews Soldiering: Observations from Korea, Vietnam, and Safe Places. By Henry G. Gole... New Glory: Expanding America's Global Supremacy. By Ralph Peters... Sands of Empire: Missionary Zeal, American Foreign Policy, and the Hazards of Global Ambition. By Robert W. Merry... etc. |
Parameters
Winter 2006/2007
Jim Baker |
Systems Thinking and Counterinsurgencies This article presents the essentials of a successful counterinsurgency strategy by applying a technique known as systems thinking. Systems thinking has proven successful in other contexts at explaining human behavior, policy choices, unintended consequences, and the resistance of systems to change. |
Parameters
Winter 2005/2006 |
Book Reviews The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War by Andrew J. Bacevich... 1776 by David McCullough... West Point: Two Centuries and Beyond edited by Lance Betros... What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building by Noah Feldman... etc. |
Parameters
November 2004 |
Commentary & Reply Technology and the Yom Kippur War... More on "Attrition" -- Maneuver, Theory, and Strategy... etc. |
National Defense
March 2007
Sandra I. Erwin |
Special Forces' Skills `Needed More Than Ever' Experts are questioning whether the Pentagon is making the best use of highly skilled special operations forces in the nation's war against extremist Islamic groups. |
Parameters
Summer 2008
Robert Gates |
Reflections on Leadership Partners in Command, a book by Mark Perry, is an account of the unique relationship between General Dwight D. Eisenhower and General George Marshall, and how they played a significant role in the American victory in World War II. |
Popular Mechanics
February 12, 2009
Joe Pappalardo |
The Future of War: Can Special Ops Become Business as Usual? Is the Pentagon capable of shifting its resources and strategies over to so-called irregular warfare? Experts at the Special Operations Conference in D.C. debate whether or not the U.S. is ready for a new kind of fight. |
Parameters
Winter 2006/2007 |
Book Reviews From Omaha Beach to Dawson's Ridge: The Combat Journal of Captain Joe Dawson. By Cole C. Kingseed... The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes. Edited by James J. F. Forest... etc. |
Parameters
Spring 2005 |
Book Reviews Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War....The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S.... etc. |
IEEE Spectrum
March 2006
C. A. Fowler |
Asymmetric Warfare: A Primer The armed forces of United States are the most capable military ever assembled. Are they designed, however, to handle a determined insurgency? Here's a look using famous engineer Frederick W. Lanchester's Mathematics in Warfare as a guide. |
Wired
November 27, 2007
Noah Shachtman |
How Technology Almost Lost the War: In Iraq, the Critical Networks Are Social -- Not Electronic A network-centric approach to war allows us to swiftly locate our target and destroy it, but it doesn't allow us to connect with local people to rebuild a city. |
Parameters
Spring 2007 |
Book Reviews The new book, Fiasco, wastes no time in cutting a wide swath through Washington and Baghdad in this critique on the war in Iraq... State of Denial is the third book by Bob Woodward on the war in Iraq... etc. |
Vietnam
Stephen B. Young |
LBJ's Disengagement Strategy Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker's charge from President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967 was to de-escalate the Vietnam conflict without losing the war. He did just that. |
National Defense
April 2005
Roxana Tiron |
Irregular Warfare Counter-insurgency in Iraq provides a template for fighting terrorism. |
Parameters
Spring 2006
Wade Markel |
Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of Population Control Thirty years after the end of the Vietnam War, the U.S. and its Army again find themselves confronted with a tenacious insurgency, this time in Iraq. Here's a look at Britain's victory in Malaya as a model to emulate. |
Parameters
Autumn 2007 |
Book Reviews Kimberly Kagan in The Eye of Command proposes that John Keegan's Face of Battle approach to narrating battles suffers fatal flaws... War Made New by Max Boot examines 500 years of military innovation... etc. |
Parameters
Autumn 2007
Gregory L. Cantwell |
Nation-Building: A Joint Enterprise When America's Army is at war, is the nation also at war? |
National Defense
August 2007
Grace Jean |
Defense Technologies for an Uncertain Future The United States is at a crossroads when it comes to developing defense technologies for a future that seems obscure at best. |
Parameters
Autumn 2008
Daniel S. Roper |
Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War Though policy initiatives since September 11, 2001 have positively influenced certain agencies in their efforts to secure America, some steps have actually limited the nation's effectiveness in countering the threats it faces. |
Parameters
Summer 2007
Clancy & Crossett |
Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare There is little foundational understanding of what success means in irregular warfare that will assist analysts in interpreting operational effectiveness. |
| Vietnam |
Desperate Hours During Tet: Inside MACV Headquarters As General William Westmoreland's chief of staff at the time of the 1968 Tet Offensive, Maj. Gen. Walter 'Dutch' Kerwin had a key seat with the military inner circle during one of the most critical events of the war. |
Vietnam
December 2005
Lewis Sorley |
The Abrams Tapes The once-classified tape recordings of General Creighton Abrams' staff meetings provide an unparalleled window into the inner workings of MACV headquarters. |
National Defense
March 2004
Roxana Tiron |
Real-World Missions Shape Army Training The U.S. Army has reorganized its training centers to fill gaps in areas such as stability and support operations, according to senior officials. The revamped training programs draw from lessons learned from counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. |
National Defense
June 2013
James E. Rainey |
Readers Sound Off on Recent Stories What can we do right now to improve how we fight modern wars? Second, how do we create, in the words of Gen. Robert Cone, "a structural imperative that ensures we do not lose the lessons of the last decade of war?" |
National Defense
May 2004
Harold Kennedy |
The New face of Peacekeeping U.S. leaders have began to rediscover the value of peacekeeping operations. |
